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THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE TO RECOGNITION OF A 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT: A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
MICHAEL TRAYNOR* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The American Law Institute’s proposed federal statute 
provides various defenses to recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.1  This comment focuses on the proposed new 
corruption defense:  “A foreign judgment shall not be recognized 
or enforced in a court in the United States if the party resisting 
recognition or enforcement establishes that: . . . the judgment was 
rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable 
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the 
judgment in question.”2 
The proposed statutory text is accompanied by a comment that:  
 
The defense of possible corruption in the rendering 
court is one that has not traditionally been an 
explicit ground for nonrecognition or 
nonenforcement by courts in the United States.  
However, concerns about corruption in the 
judiciaries of certain countries and the effect of 
                                                     
* President Emeritus and Chair of the Council Emeritus, American Law 
Institute; Senior Counsel, Cobalt LLP.  The views stated are personal. 
1 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND 
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE (Am. Law Inst. 2006) [hereinafter PROPOSED FEDERAL 
STATUTE 2006].  Grounds for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment include lack of 
fair procedure, corruption, unacceptable basis of jurisdiction, lack of reasonable 
notice, fraud, public policy, and various other grounds.  Id. §§ 5(a)(i)—(vi), 5(b), 
5(c), 6.  See generally Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgements on Judgments: A View from 
America, 19 KINGS L.J. 235, 243 (2008) (explaining that concerns about possible 
judiciary corruption led the ALI to provide a defense to recognition where the 
integrity of the rendering court is called into question); Linda J. Silberman & 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country 
Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 635 
(2000) (discussing how the proposed ALI statute would function “concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments.”). 
2  PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, § 5(a)(ii). 
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corruption in the particular case led to inclusion of 
this additional defense.”3   
The corruption defense is related to the defense of lack of fair 
procedures “but is distinct in that it calls for a showing specific to 
the litigation on which the judgment in question is based.”4  The 
proposed statute does not define “integrity,” “substantial and 
justifiable doubt,” or “corruption.”5 
The Reporters, Andreas Lowenfeld and Linda Silberman, note 
that:  
[C]ourts in the United States have only rarely 
pronounced directly on corruption of foreign courts, 
and when they have done so, it has nearly always 
been in the context of a motion to dismiss on 
grounds of forum non conveniens, with plaintiffs 
contending that the proposed alternative forum 
should be rejected because they cannot receive a fair 
trial there.  In most instances, such arguments have 
been rejected when the assertion of corruption could 
not be linked to the particular party or litigation.6 
 
Regardless of whether Congress acts on the proposed federal 
statute, the Reporters’ thorough analysis will continue to be helpful 
to courts, legislators, lawyers, and scholars. 
This comment refers to internal ALI history and recent 
developments.  It suggests that courts should view the corruption 
                                                     
3 Id. § 5 cmt. d. 
4 Id. (“[T]he burden is on the person resisting recognition or enforcement of 
the foreign judgment to show circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable 
doubt about the integrity of the rendering court.  Satisfying the burden requires 
showing corruption in the particular case and its probable impact on the 
judgment in question.  In ruling that the burden has been satisfied, the court in the 
United States must explain the reasons for its doubt about the integrity of the 
judgment in question.”)  
5 See PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, § 1.  The corruption 
defense provided for in the ALI proposed statute is similar to that provided in § 
4(c)(7) in the 2005 Revision to the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Act.  See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT (Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs, revised 2005).  
6  PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, Reporters’ Notes to §5 ¶ 3.  
Also in this note, the Reporters cite to Maria Dakolias and Kim Thachuk to 
support the proposition that judiciary corruption is pervasive in many countries.  
Id.  See Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A 
Critical Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353 (2000) (discussing the 
problem corruption poses to the legitimacy of government).  
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defense cautiously and look first to traditional defenses such as 
lack of fair procedures, fraud, or denial of the core principles of 
due process.  If one of the traditional defenses applies, courts will 
likely determine that it is unnecessary to consider the corruption 
defense; if none of the traditional defenses applies, courts will 
likely be cautious about what weight if any to give to the 
corruption defense. 
2. INTERNAL ALI HISTORY 
Early drafts of the ALI Project, such as the draft discussed at 
the annual meeting of ALI members in 2002, did not contain a 
corruption defense.7  The main debate at this meeting concerned 
reciprocity. 8   The Reporters shortly thereafter proposed a new 
subsection “concerning the problem of allegations of corruption on 
the part of the rendering court.”9  It provided a defense if “the 
judgment was rendered in circumstances that cast justifiable doubt 
about the integrity of the rendering court.”10  The Reporters soon 
added to that defense the phrase “with respect to the judgment in 
question.”11 
In 2003, the ALI discussed the proposed statute including the 
revised corruption defense. 12   At the suggestion of President 
Emeritus Roswell B. Perkins, the Reporters agreed to insert  
“substantial and” before “justifiable doubt” on the ground that the 
latter two words alone “are not adequate to give some quantum 
aspect to the doubt, [or] to the degree of doubt, and indeed 
                                                     
7 INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Am. Law. Inst., 
Discussion Draft 2002).  This draft was preceded by several memoranda, a 
preliminary draft, and three Council drafts.  The name of the project was changed 
to its present name in the Proposed Final Draft (2005). See RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 
(Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2005) [hereinafter PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT].   
8 Am. Law Inst., 2002 Proceedings, 79 A.L.I. PROC. 357, 357-68 (2002) 
(documenting the debate concerning the reciprocity provision contained in the 
draft of § 5).  The reciprocity issue was resolved in a separate and complex 
section, the essence of which is to recognize a defense of lack of reciprocity but to 
put the burden of proof on the party raising the defense.  PROPOSED FEDERAL 
STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, § 7. 
9 INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT, at xiii (Am. Law Inst., 
Council Draft No. 2, 2002).  
10  Id. § 5(a)(ii). 
11  INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT § 5(a)(ii) (Am. Law 
Inst., Council Draft No. 3, 2002). 
12  INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Am. Law Inst., 
Tentative Draft 2003). 
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paradoxically it may be easier to justify a scintilla of doubt than 
otherwise.”13  Accordingly, the next draft provided a defense if 
“the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial 
and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court 
with respect to the judgment in question . . . .”14  
The proposed corruption defense was not controversial within 
the ALI.  The revised language was maintained throughout the 
final stages of the project:  in 2004, the ALI debated other defenses 
but not the corruption defense;15 in 2005, it approved the Proposed 
Final Draft;16 and, in 2006, it published the proposed statute and 
accompanying analysis.17 
3. POST-PUBLICATION DEVELOPMENTS 
Since publication of the ALI proposed federal statute in 2006, 
there have been a few cases, international reform efforts, and 
scholarly articles on the corruption issue that bear noting. 
In the notorious Chevron/Ecuador case, 18  the Second Circuit 
reversed a district court order that granted Chevron a global 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a judgment 
entered by an Ecuadorian court against Chevron.  The Second 
Circuit held that the district court “erred in construing the 
Recognition Act [a New York state statute] to grant putative 
judgment-debtors a cause of action to challenge foreign judgments 
before enforcement of those judgments is sought.  Judgment-
debtors can challenge a foreign judgment’s validity under the 
                                                     
13  Am. Law Inst., 80th Annual Meeting: Proceedings 2003, 80 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 134 
(2003). 
14  INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT § 5(a)(ii) (Am. Law 
Inst., Tentative Draft (Revised) 2004). 
15 Instead, ALI highlighted debates on proposed fraud and public policy 
defenses, among others. See Am. Law Inst., Annual Meeting: 2004 Proceedings, 81 
A.L.I. PROC. 282—94 (2004) (discussing AM. LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL 
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT § 5 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 
(2004)). 
16 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 7, at § 5(a)(ii), § 5 cmt. d; see Am. Law 
Inst., Annual Meeting: Proceedings 2005, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 169 (2005) (providing 
record of the approval of the Proposed Final Draft). 
17 PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, at § 5, cmt 5. Two 
explanatory paragraphs were added to comment d of § 5 in the final rule proposal 
in 2006.  Id. § 5 cmt. d; supra, text accompanying n. 4. 
18 Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 232 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 423 (2012). 
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Recognition Act only defensively . . . .”19  The court noted that “[i]t 
is a particularly weighty matter for a court in one country to 
declare that another country’s legal system is so corrupt or unfair 
that its judgments are entitled to no respect from the courts of 
other nations.”20 
In Osorio v. Dow Chemical Co.,21 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 
district court judgment denying recognition under Florida law to a 
judgment of a Nicaragua court and upholding jurisdictional, due 
process, and public policy defenses.  Notably, however, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated that “we do not address the broader issue 
of whether Nicaragua as a whole ‘does not provide impartial 
tribunals’ and decline to adopt the district court’s holding on that 
question.”22  
In Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co. v. Robinson Helicopter 
Co.,23 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a decision enforcing a judgment 
from the People’s Republic of China.  It held that the defendant, 
who had won a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss an earlier 
proceeding in the United States and agreed to the jurisdiction of 
the PRC court, was estopped from arguing that the PRC judgment 
was not enforceable.24 
 Internationally, as well as in specific countries, there are 
growing efforts to strengthen the independence and integrity of 
courts.  For example:  the UN General Assembly recently received 
the report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges 
and Lawyers, which addresses judicial corruption;25 the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has published Basic Principles on 
                                                     
19 Id. at 234. The court also stated that “[t]he Recognition Act nowhere 
authorizes a court to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the preemptive 
suit of a putative judgment-debtor.”  Id. at 240.  It bears noting that the ALI Project 
would authorize federal court jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of the 
states, for an “action brought to enforce a foreign judgment or to secure a 
declaration with respect to recognition under [the] Act.” PROPOSED FEDERAL 
STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, § 8(a). 
20 Chevron, 667 F.3d at 244. 
21 635 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1045 (2012).  The 
district court’s decision is reported at Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 
1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
22 Osorio, 635 F.3d at 1279.  
23 425 F. App’x 580, 580 (9th Cir. 2011). 
24 Id. 
25 See generally Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges 
& Lawyers, Aug. 13, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/67/305; GAOR, 67th Sess., Item 70(b) of 
the Provisional Agenda (2012) (analyzing the effects of judicial corruption and 
recommending ways in which judges can fight corruption generally). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
TRAYNOR (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  6:29 PM 
2013] THE CORRUPTION DEFENSE 760 
the Independence of the Judiciary;26 Transparency International 
has published a comprehensive report27 and an advocacy toolkit;28 
the ABA initiated the World Justice Project;29 and other 
international groups have published recommendations to prevent 
corruption.30  In general, these reports call for systematic reform.31  
In addition, scholars have contributed varied perspectives.32 
4. A WORD OF CAUTION 
It is too early to assess the influence on the law of the ALI’s 
recognition of emerging international concerns about judicial 
corruption.  On the separate question of whether courts in the 
United States should uphold the proposed new corruption defense 
in particular cases, I expect they will proceed with caution. 
If, as will often be the case, the defendant lost an appeal in the 
appellate courts of the foreign jurisdiction that rendered the 
                                                     
26 See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Adopted by the 
7th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
from Aug. 26 to Sept. 6, 1985 (1985), http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?d=2248 
(outlining the basic principles on the  independence of the judiciary).  
27 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: 
CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, at xxviii (2007) (exploring the impact of judicial 
corruption on human rights, economic development and governance, and 
recommending reform efforts to promote judicial independence and 
accountability). 
28 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, COMBATTING CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMS: ADVOCACY TOOLKIT 3 (2007) (assisting [Transparency International] 
chapters to undertake effective advocacy to combat judicial corruption in their 
respective countries). 
29 See generally WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2013) (“The World Justice Project leads a global movement to 
strengthen the rule of law for the development of communities of opportunity 
and equity.”). 
30 See, e.g., USAID, REDUCING CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY 1 (2009) (advising 
each State Party “in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system and without prejudice to judicial independence, [to] take measures to 
strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members 
of the judiciary.”).  See also Petter Langseth & Oliver Stople, UNODCCP, 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity Against Corruption, 10 CICP 1, 2 (2001) (examining 
causes of judicial corruption and offering recommendations based on the 
outcomes of the Workshop of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial 
Integrity). 
31 For the countervailing view that judicial reform initiatives are designed to 
favor the interests of investors and largely ignore the poor, see James Thuo Gathii, 
Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
125, 187-197 (2009). 
32 See, nn.32—38, infra. 
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judgment, courts here will be concerned about examining whether 
corruption extended to the foreign appellate courts and was not 
remedied by them.  Courts also may be skeptical of “forum 
shopper’s remorse,” i.e., claims by defendants who initially, and 
over the plaintiffs’ opposition, avoided original jurisdiction in the 
United States on the ground that a fair hearing could be obtained 
in the foreign country and who now contend that the ensuing 
foreign judgment is corrupt.33  Courts also should recognize that 
the foreign judgment may have been rendered in favor of plaintiffs 
seeking to establish fundamental human rights and is under 
collateral attack—perhaps after years of litigation—by a defendant 
with enormous resources to attempt to avoid eventual 
enforcement; upholding the corruption defense will effectively 
make the defendant judgment proof in the United States. 
If U.S. courts consider the corruption defense, they will need to 
decide what evidence, if any, is admissible and relevant and what 
judicial notice, if any, should be taken about whether there is a 
“substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the 
rendering court with respect to the judgment in question.”  They 
will need to articulate their reasons for any determination that such 
a doubt exists and explain the necessity for upholding a 
“corruption” defense if the traditional defenses discussed below 
are not available. 
Courts in the United States should also be alert to dual risks, 
one being the possibility of undermining gradually evolving 
measures to prevent corruption in the country whose judgment is 
challenged as corrupt, 34  and the other being the possibility of 
jeopardizing reciprocity there for U.S. judgments or provoking 
other counter measures.  They should also be sensitive to the 
potential foreign policy and human rights issues that may be 
                                                     
33 See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447-
48 (2011) (quoting Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. 
COUNSEL, Apr. 1, 2010, at 63) (describing forum shopper’s remorse in the context 
of the Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron). 
34 See David Pimentel, Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: 
Defining Judicial Structure in Light of Judges’ Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2009) (“Improvements in judicial performance, occasioned by 
structural adjustments to the protections and discipline accorded the judges and 
the judicial branch as a whole, will come only as a slow, evolving response to such 
adjustments.”). 
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implicated by a ruling that a foreign judgment is corrupt.35  Our 
courts wisely demonstrate caution about condemning foreign 
judicial systems as corrupt.  They will also be wise in 
demonstrating caution in assessing individual judgments.  As 
Linda Silberman recently testified at a hearing before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, the corruption defense: 
 
[R]epresents an aspect of the foreign relations 
interests of the United States.  The defense of 
possible corruption in the rendering court is not one 
that has traditionally been an explicit ground for 
non-recognition, although that concern may give 
rise to one of the other usual defenses.  Again, were 
a federal statute to be enacted, it would be Congress 
that would determine whether such a ground for 
non-recognition should be included and what 
criteria should be used to make the assessment.36 
5. THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSES 
Ordinarily, traditional defenses should afford sufficient 
protection against foreign judgments that are corrupt, for example, 
lack of fair procedures,37 fraud,38 or denial of core principles of due 
                                                     
35 For additional recent articles, see, for example, Xandra E. Kramer, 
Approaches to Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments and the International Fight Against 
Corruption, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION, ADVISORY 
REPORT FOR THE DUTCH ROYAL SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (2012), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2165243; John S. Baker, Jr. 
& Agustin Parise, Conflicts in International Tort Litigation Between U.S. and Latin 
American Courts, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2010); Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The 
Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the American Treatment of Inadequate Foreign Courts, 
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 1021 (2010); Omar E. García-Bolívar, Lack of Judicial Independence 
and its Impact on Transnational and International Litigation, 18 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 
29 (2012); Thomas Kelly, An Unwise and Unmanageable Anachronism: Why the Time 
Has Come to Eliminate Systemic Inadequacy as a Basis for Nonrecognition of Foreign 
Judgments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 555 (2011); Christina Weston, The Enforcement 
Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for 
Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 731 (2011). 
36 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Linda J. Silberman, Martin Lipton Professor of Law, 
New York University School of Law), available at  http://judiciary.house.gov 
/hearings/pdf/Silberman%2011152011.pdf.  
37 PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, § 5(a)(i). According to Kelly, 
a “far more effective way of encouraging procedural fairness and impartiality 
would be to discard systemic inadequacy in favor of proceeding-specific 
inadequacy and thereby create incentives for foreign plaintiffs to ensure that the 
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process.39  As ALI Director Emeritus Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and I 
have recently written: 
 
 Core principles of due process include an impartial 
tribunal, opportunity to be heard, right to the 
assistance of counsel of the party’s choice, and due 
notice . . . [t]hese principles are also recognized 
internationally as essential to fair procedure.  For 
example, a judgment rendered by a judge who is 
bribed by one party should not be entitled to 
recognition and enforcement in the United States 
even if the foreign judicial system in which it is 
rendered is otherwise fair.40 
6. CONCLUSION 
 Within the ALI, the corruption defense was not 
controversial.  The ALI thereby acknowledged emerging 
international efforts to strengthen the judiciary and provided a 
placeholder for an unusually compelling case.  Courts in the 
United States will continue to be cautious, and rightly so in my 
view, about upholding the corruption defense in particular cases.  
                                                                                                                        
process is fair.”  Kelly, supra note 35, at 579.  It is my impression that, in human 
relations, there is a difference between saying broadly “you’re wrong” and simply 
“I feel wronged,” and in foreign relations, there is a comparable difference 
between saying broadly “you’re systematically unfair or your judgment is 
corrupt” and simply “under our constitutional requirement of due process to 
every ‘person,’ we cannot recognize the judgment.” 
38  PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, at § 5(a)(v).  For the 
suggestion that “it may well be easier for a resisting party to raise ‘substantial 
doubt’ about the ‘integrity’ of a judgment than it would be to affirmatively prove 
‘fraud,’” see Timothy G. Nelson, Down in Flames: Three U.S. Courts Decline 
Recognition to Judgments from Mexico, Citing Corruption, 44 INT’L LAW. 897, 912 
(2010).  Whether a U.S. court, however, would permit a judgment defendant to 
take the “easier” route is doubtful. 
39 PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE 2006, supra note 1, at §5(a)(vi); see id. at 
Reporters’ Note to §5, para. 7 (repugnance to public policy), subparagraph (b) 
(relationship to the Uniform Act). 
40 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michael Traynor, Foreign Judgments: Is 
“System Fairness” Sufficient or is “Specific Fairness” also Required for Recognition and 
Enforcement?, 10 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 2 (2012), http://bjil.typepad.com/ 
publicist/2012/04/foreign-judgments-is-system-fairness-sufficient-or-is-specific-
fairness-also-required-for-recognition-and.html.  For our brief, see Brief for 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michael Traynor, Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Tropp v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 385 Fed. Appx. 36 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3728 (2011) (No. 10-1249), 2011 WL 1881809. 
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If traditional defenses such as lack of fair procedures, fraud, or due 
process do not apply, courts understandably also will and should 
be cautious about pursuing evidentiary inquiries and judicial 
notice or venturing to make new law in a sensitive area of foreign 
relations. 
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